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ABSTRACT 
 
Floodplain management policy implementation and change involves a range of actors 
and opportunities for power to be exercised. Considering four conceptualizations of 
power envisioned by Dahl, Bachrach & Baratz, Lukes, and Emerson, this paper explores 
the actors and instances where power emerges in floodplain management policy 
implementation and change, using Alberta, Canada, as our focus. We consider which 
conceptualization is most reflective of the Alberta context. We conclude that all four 
views of behaviour are relevant here, with some power dynamics between actors more 
complex than others. Further, these dynamics change over time, and therefore the trade-
offs to be made also change. Understanding power relations allows for clearer 
identification of these trade-offs and, therefore, the potential winners and losers in 
floodplain management policy. We describe strategies for assisting in this process of 
managing power relations, including information sharing, transparency and actively 
managing the policy process. 
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Introduction 
 
With changes in the patterns of precipitation, higher frequency of intense rainfalls and the 
threat of sea level rise, flooding and flood risk management continue to be of concern to 
governments (IPCC, 2014). As floodplain development occurs, it enhances the 
probability of future flooding and flood damage (e.g. Driessen et al, 2016; ASC, 2014; 
Parker, 1995, 342). Increasingly, non-structural measures are being used to manage this 
flood risk, including floodplain management policy (Dawson et al., 2011, 629).  
 
Due to the potential for significant environmental impacts and damage to property during 
flooding, floodplain management policy (FMP) is developed to guide spatial planning 
and hence land-use decision-making in floodplains, as choices (and trade-offs) must be 
made between flood risk management and other land uses (see Tunstall et al, 2009). Thus 
FMP can encompass a range of measures, including requirements for approval to develop 
(e.g. prohibiting development, or setting conditions for development), flood insurance, 
and flood disaster relief (e.g. Government of Newfoundland & Labrador, 1996).  
7  
8 But this is a complex matter, and there are numerous actors involved in flood risk 
management, with varying degrees of power to influence policy and its implementation 
(see Thaler and Levin-Keitel, 2016; Albrecht, 2016; Penning-Rowsell & Johnson, 2015), 
including floodplain management policy (e.g. Driessen et al, 2016; van Herk et al, 2011; 
Pardoe et al, 2011). Our paper here seeks to outline the actors and instances where power 
relations emerge in floodplain management policy implementation and change, focusing 
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on Alberta, Canada, and considers four conceptualizations of power to determine which 
is most reflective of the Alberta context. Finally, it seeks to provide some means of 
identifying power dynamics in practice and associated strategies for managing those 
dynamics in the course of developing policy, its implementation, and eventual decision-
making.  
 
Actors and Conceptualizations of Power  
There are many conceptualizations of power (see Allen (2009); and Ailon (2006) for 
examples; also Lukes (2005)), each of which involves relations between different actors. 
For the purposes of this discussion, four such conceptualizations or models of power are 
reviewed here, following an elaboration, below, of the actors generally involved in FMP 
and their aspirations and interests. The first three conceptualizations describe power 
where actor A is dominant over actor B. The fourth views both A and B as having power 
at the same time, with power manifesting itself according to who holds the needed 
resources at a given time.  These models of power relations were chosen for their 
prevalence in the literature and their ability to be readily applied to a government policy 
context.  
Actors and Power in Floodplain Management Policy 
Floodplain management policy implementation and change involves a range of actors. 
These may include national, provincial/state, and municipal governments; regulatory 
agencies; developers (see Pardoe, Penning-Rowsell & Tunstall, 2011); interest groups 
(Penning-Rowsell & Johnson, 2015); and the general public [Interviewee 5, interview 1]
1
. 
Further, there are many opportunities for power to be exercised by these actors. Parties 
may be investigated and punished for wrong-doing, applications to develop in a 
floodplain may be accepted or rejected, policy change may be advanced or not advanced, 
and funding may be provided or not to compensate for damage sustained in the flooding 
of an occupied floodplain [5,1; 4]. Individuals or groups may also seek to influence 
governments, insurers or developers, and national governments may exert power through 
policies or rules that must be adopted or adhered to by local governments and 
organizations, through the control of spending, and by holding organizations at lower 
levels to account (Penning-Rowsell & Johnson, 2015). 
Dahl: Power as Decision-making 
In 1957, Robert Dahl (1957, 203) viewed power as a relation between actors, wherein “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do”. Dahl’s view of power focused on participation in decision-making. His 
approach emphasized rigorous methodologies and measured attributes (Clegg, 1989, 8); 
he deemed the exercise of power to have occurred only when it could be seen to be 
exercised, as in voting (Clegg, 83). To identify a powerful group, “concrete decisions” 
must be examined (Dahl, 203).  
                                                        
1 Subsequent citations of interviewees are given as [5,1], [5,2] or just [1] etc. See 
table 2. 
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Bachrach & Baratz: Power as Decision-making and Non-decision-making 
Critical of those who focused only on power as a function of decision-making, Bachrach 
and Baratz (1962) identified two ‘faces’ of power. The first face represents power as a 
function of the ability of A to make decisions that may or may not adversely impact 
another party (B), similar to the view of Dahl. The second face views power as the ability 
to effect non-decision-making (Bachrach & Baratz, 948-949). According to Bachrach and 
Baratz, non-decision-making power could manifest itself in three ways: by A not 
listening to the demands of B; by B failing to raise an issue with A because B believes A 
would oppose the idea (Clegg, 1989, 77), or through A exerting control over political 
processes and systems, and over values, beliefs and opinions of less powerful actors in 
the systems, thereby preventing decision-making on issues important to B (Bachrach & 
Baratz, 1962, 949).  
Lukes: Power in Decision-making, Non-decision-making, and Subconscious 
Internalization of What “A” Wants 
Lukes (1974) conceived of power as having three dimensions, including the two 
discussed above (Clegg, 1989). Lukes argued that power was not always related to a 
difference in interests or always seen in the form of individual actions. As Lukes (23) 
states: “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, 
but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants”, ensuring compliance by controlling thoughts and desires. Power in this case is 
derived from the “construction of meaning in social life”, and allows A to influence B to 
adopt the goals, values and attitudes of A (Antonsen, 2009,186). In this view, 
socialization processes are the key means of “serving the favour of the privileged” 
(Antonsen, 186).  
Emerson: Power as a Function of Resource Dependency 
In the preceding conceptualizations, A is viewed as dominant over B (see Ailon, 2006, 
781). However, viewing the relationship between A and B as more complex, Emerson 
(1962, 32-4) saw power as a function of dependency between A and B. He also argued 
that both A and B could hold power at the same time, and that the exertion of power by 
one did not negate the power held by the other. According to Emerson, who holds power 
at a given time was related to control over resources or “things” the other values.  This 
may include such “things” as economic dependence, need for social belonging, or respect 
for treaties between countries (Emerson, 1962, 33). Emerson contended “A depends upon 
B if he aspires to goals or gratifications whose achievement is facilitated by appropriate 
actions on B’s part”. Mutual dependency, in his view, suggested that both A or B could 
control or influence the conduct of the other, and this mutual dependency meant that both 
A and B had some ability to affect the other’s gratification.  
 
Methodology 
To answer our question concerning which conceptualization of power is most reflective 
of the Alberta context, a review of primary and secondary print sources and 
organizational websites was undertaken, and seven semi-structured qualitative interviews 
were conducted with six representatives from the provincial government of Alberta 
(policy and operational management), the City of Edmonton, and the rural municipality 
of Rocky View County (Table 1). These locations were chosen owing to the FMP issues 
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that have been evident there, including over development approvals, compensation 
payments, developer lobbying, and public and their politicians’ attitudes. 
 
The triangulation of methods, participants, and information derived from print sources 
allowed the verification and cross-checking of information collected to improve rigour 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, 4). Personal communication citations in this paper from 
interviews were crosschecked with other participants and print sources to ensure that our 
research findings were not simply an expression of individual opinions (see Neuman, 
2006, 153).  
 
Representatives were interviewed at both the management level and the operational level, 
with experience in policy and land use decisions both represented, and care was taken to 
ensure that both an urban and a rural municipal view were captured. It should be noted 
that although triangulation was used across and within provincial and municipal 
governments, it is expected that the experience between municipalities will vary 
significantly [2; 6], and that the decisions made at the provincial level can also vary by 
geographic region [4; 3]. Thus, additional research is required if we are to understand 
further the subtle regional differences and temporal shifts in floodplain management 
policy in the Alberta context.  
 
Despite these challenges, it is expected that the discussion here is sufficiently generalized 
to avoid some of the pitfalls of a relatively small number of interviews, particularly with 
municipalities. In line with ethics requirements, participants were asked if they could be 
cited; two preferred to remain completely anonymous (Table 1). Other participants 
preferred to remain anonymous for specific information items.  
 
It is further acknowledged that policy is dynamic and that some rules discussed below 
may have changed since the research was conducted and published. This is not expected 
to change the impact of this paper, as policy context and the particular associated power 
dynamics are often re all lated to a snapshot in time. 
 
Floodplain management policy in Alberta 
Floodplain management policy implementation and change in Alberta is multi-layered, as 
in most countries, there involving the Canadian federal government, provincial 
government, municipal governments, interest groups (the development lobby; watershed 
groups; industry groups; non-governmental-organizations), development project 
proponents, and the public. Their roles are described in Table 2. Our review of the current 
floodplain management policy processes in Alberta and their context, derived through our 
interviews and literature analysis, has revealed six situations where power relations 
manifest. These are discussed below. Many appear to focus on policy implementation, 
but that disguises the process of policy change that is behind the issues being “tested” in 
policy implementation situations. 
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1. The Water Act Approval Process – Provincial Government and Proponent 
Projects that have the potential to impact on the flow of water, including floodwater, must 
seek approval under the provincial Water Act
2
 [4]. However, in the past some flexibility 
was seen in decision-making.  For example, prior to the 2005 flooding, Water Act 
approvals were reportedly easier to obtain in Alberta; but those same floods, launching a 
significant politician-led review process, mobilized action in favour of those affected by 
floods and more stringent floodplain management, and away from those developers who 
may have wished to develop in the floodplain (cf. Johnson et al, 2005). A stronger stance 
has consequently been taken on development in the ‘floodway’ since 2005 (see Table 2), 
and the standard response is now ‘No’ in southern Alberta3.  
 
As a result, municipalities have been referring project proponents to the provincial 
authorities earlier in the planning phases in order to avoid rejection at later stages [4; 6]. 
Some exceptions have been made where proposed projects predicted minor impacts and 
were deemed to have no potential impacts on other landowners [4]. Where projects can 
proceed, conditions are imposed to minimize risk [4]. However, as interest in flooding 
waned, as the floods of 2005 and their impacts became a memory, it appears that so too 
did interest in policy change towards increasing the stringency of flood risk management.  
 
However, context continues to change; in June 2013, an even larger flood – the largest 
natural disaster in the province’s history - caused $5 billion in damage (Government of 
Alberta, 2014). This, and a growing perception that this may be a foretaste of greater risk 
in the future from climate change, will have undoubtedly have set in motion a further 
rearrangement of power dynamics and influences on floodplain management policy for 
the province, as it has elsewhere (e.g. ASC, 2014). 
 
2. The Municipal Development Approval Process – Municipal Government and 
Proponents 
Similarly, proponents of development projects
4
 must seek permission to develop in the 
floodplain through a municipal process guided by bylaws, which vary between 
municipalities [1]. Under a typical process, a proponent seeks a land use change approval 
from the municipality to convert, for example, agriculture land to an urban subdivision. 
When planning details are sufficient to understand the development proposed, a 
municipality decides to accept or reject the application [1; 4]. Municipalities may also 
approve development with conditions, including those related to development setbacks to 
mitigate flood risk [6; 2] (Government of Alberta, 2012c, 26). Municipalities may say 
“No” to a development if, for example, it does not fit in with a broader county plan that 
the municipality has developed for the area [6], or if they do not feel that the proposed 
new land-use is appropriate [1].  
                                                        
2
 See Water Act, Chapter W-3, Section 36(1) (2000).  
3
 Discussions with several other participants from the northern part of the province suggest this may not be 
as consistent in the north [1; 3]. Regional (watershed-based) policy in the south to manage water shortage 
in that part of the province may make it easier to reject applications for development; in the north there is 
more water and greater public pressure to develop [3].  
4
 Utility projects are exempt under Edmonton Zoning Bylaw 12800, Part IV, Section 812 [1]. 
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In Edmonton, for example, much of the land that could be developed has plans to guide 
decision-makers [1; 2]. The majority of floodplain here is covered by the North 
Saskatchewan River Valley Area Redevelopment Plan developed in 1985, wherein the 
majority of the floodplain is set aside as “metropolitan” (or park land and therefore not 
subject to development (see City of Edmonton, 2010, 19)). Should development be 
proposed, the decision is regulated, with the City requiring certification from an engineer 
attesting to the flood risk, or lack thereof. This approval is subject to the conditions under 
Edmonton Zoning Bylaw 12800, section 14.4, and this then relieves the City of the 
liability in the event of a flood [1]. 
 
There has been the suggestion, however, that municipalities may find it difficult to reject 
development proposals, as such development enhances the municipalities’ tax base [6]. A 
provincial flood mitigation report developed by a ministerial task force provided 
recommendations for mitigating flood risk in the wake of the 2005 flood. It indicated that 
smaller municipalities were supportive of restricting disaster recovery payment for “new 
inappropriate development in flood risk areas”, but that larger cities with significant 
amounts of riverside development were not in favour, stating that this would prevent 
development in “very high value areas” (Groeneveld, 2006, 13). In 2004, municipalities 
raised 89.6 percent of their revenues through their own sources; roughly half of that was 
through property-related taxes (see Lesage & McMillan, 2008, 26). In 2008, Alberta 
municipalities were reported to be “squeezed fiscally between downloaded 
responsibilities, rising expectations and a slowly growing tax and revenue base” (LeSage 
& McMillan, 27).  
 
3. The Flood Damage Reduction Program - Federal and Provincial Governments  
The federal Flood Damage Reduction Program (FDRP) sought to discourage floodplain 
development through setting out guiding policy principles, and provided support for the 
mapping of flood risk areas (de Loe, 2000). Agreements negotiated with provinces under 
this programme contained three core principles promoted by the federal government: (a) 
governments would not build or support flood prone development in an area designated 
as high risk; (b) no payment of flood disaster assistance would be forthcoming for 
development built after the area is designated as high risk; and, (c) parties to the 
agreement would encourage local authorities to zone according to flood risk (de Loe, 
361). 
 
Through this agreement (1989), the federal government has exerted some power on 
current floodplain management and policy in Alberta [5,1]. Under the Water Act (2000)
5
, 
government projects cannot be placed in the flood hazard areas, and the province’s 
Disaster Recovery Program policy commits to provide disaster relief only to those 
impacted by flow greater than the 1:100 year level (AEMA, 2012). The second principle 
allows the federal government to exert direct power by controlling spending through its 
policy of nonpayment to provinces for disaster relief for new developments in designated 
flood hazard areas. 
 
                                                        
5
 See Water Act, Chapter W-3, Section 96(2)(a) 
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4. Compensation for Damage to New Floodplain Development – Provincial and 
Municipal Governments 
Just as the second principle promoted by the federal programme has allowed for the 
federal government to control compensation to the provinces, the adoption of this 
principle in Alberta’s Water Act6 and disaster recovery program policy similarly grants 
the province the power to decide not to compensate municipalities for damage sustained 
in newer developments on the floodplain (see AEMA, 2012) [6].  This has reportedly led 
to some decisions not to allow development, for example in the floodplain in Rocky 
View County [6]. 
 
5. Interest Group Influence – Interest Groups and Governments 
Lobby groups may also seek to influence governments in Alberta (LeSage & McMillan, 
2008, 55; Leo, 1995). Business groups in the land development sector have been 
identified as one of the most successful and engaged groups lobbying Alberta 
municipalities (LeSage & McMillan, 2008, 55). Leo (1995, as cited by LeSage & 
McMillan, 2008, 55) found that there was a “tight compact” between developers, 
municipalities, and some politicians in Edmonton. These relationships are reported to 
continue to be strong [2]. In rural municipalities, farmers also represent their land-related 
interests (LeSage & McMillan, 2008, 55).  
 
The Urban Development Institute (UDI) is one organization that advocates for developers 
in order to maximize benefits to developers through various means [5]. In one example 
found, UDI submitted extensive comments that sought to influence policy outcomes of 
one floodplain management policy being developed [6]. Notably, however, UDI was not 
seen as a key influence on policy change in this case, as the municipal Council’s direction 
was clear that proposed policy goals were to be upheld [6].  
 
One interviewee from the City of Edmonton was not aware of any influence by UDI to 
influence policy implementation in that city, but suggested that much of the land in 
question is already covered by planning decisions and/or would be set aside as an 
environmental reserve, so the potential for influence at the operational decision level was 
not likely [2]. Another interviewee from the Province also questioned the ability of the 
development lobby to influence policy implementation at the provincial level, suggesting 
that although the lobby may not always agree with the position of the Province, it did not 
have significant influence on Water Act approval processes [1]. However, additional 
research is required to elaborate the precise influence here of lobbies in floodplain 
management policy implementation and change. 
 
6. The Public’s Influence on Policy Advancement – Politicians and the Public 
Electing a conservative government since 1971, the Alberta public, generally, has been 
resistant to policy that could impact private property rights (see Government of Alberta, 
2012a; Keene & DeCillian, 2012). This has also been suggested to be true in floodplain 
management policy [5].   
 
                                                        
6
 See Water Act, Chapter W-3, Section 96(2)(c) 
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In this case there is concern that with stronger development restrictions in the floodplain, 
landowners would be unable to develop their land [5]. Resulting concern on the part of 
politicians is suggested to have contributed to a delay in the release of a report promoting 
the prevention of further development in the floodplain, and may also have contributed to 
the slowing of policy change of a similar nature [5]; see also discussions of delay in 
Patterson (2012). It was also suggested that shortly after its drafting in 2006, its 
finalization was put on hold: as the 2005 flood receded from memory, interest in 
completing the report “waned” (Patterson, 2012, 2). It should be noted, however, that 
while public influence was a contributing factor to the delay, the primary cause of the 
delay was suggested to be the estimated large costs to implement the recommendations 
and the relatively weak condition of the economy at the time [5]. 
 
Similarly, though several years ago, public influence in Edmonton resulted in a change 
from enhanced floodplain protection to one of more development, as impacted 
communities argued that they were being “destroyed” by the City’s proposed policy 
change [2]. Furthermore, public pressures including vocal stakeholders and 
river/floodplain sensitivities can also influence floodplain development decisions at the 
provincial, Water Act approval level [3]. 
 
Analysis 
The provincial Water Act approval process in Alberta is an example of Dahl’s decision-
making power, wherein the government displays power by deciding to allow or disallow 
development in the floodplain, and in setting out conditions under which development 
may proceed if approved. Here, A (the provincial government) causes B (the proponent) 
to refrain from developing in the floodplain, when he would have otherwise preferred to 
develop. Power is clearly measurable, as “concrete decisions” are made, and the 
proponent (B) is limited in his ability to exert power over the provincial government (A).  
 
Another example of this view of power is that displayed between the federal government 
and the provincial government as it relates to the federal policy of non-payment of 
compensation for flood damage to newer development in the floodplain. Although this 
power is related to resources, it is likely that the province does not hold power in this case 
(or “things” that the federal government depends on for the achievement of its own 
goals), and is therefore not fully in line with Emerson’s view of power. Instead, it is 
aligned with Dahl’s view, as the federal government decides whether or not to direct 
compensation to the province to assist with the management of flood damage.  
 
Although additional research would be required to understand the exact influence of 
interest groups on floodplain management policy and whether their activity has resulted 
in “non-decision-making” in floodplain management policy implementation or change, at 
least one case in Rocky View County suggests that there is activity by interest groups in 
floodplain management policy and this type of activity would be important for policy 
writers and decision makers to understand. Depending on whether politicians adopt 
recommendations or stall processes on the basis of interest group activities, it is possible 
that power exercised by this group could represent a case of the ‘second face’ of power. 
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Bacharach and Baratz also suggested that power could also manifest by B failing to raise 
an issue with A because B believes A would oppose the idea (Clegg, 1989, 77). In the 
Rocky View County case, staff advised their own decision-makers against allowing some 
developments to proceed in the floodplain because of an awareness of the Province’s 
policy position on not compensating for flood damage to new development.  In this case, 
B did not undertake activities that could lead it to seek a decision from A (for 
compensation), believing that the answer would be “No”.  
 
In addition to the costs of the policy proposal and the economy, here, it also appears that 
“the public” (A) may be a factor that contributes to a slowing of the advancement of more 
stringent policy on floodplain development by the provincial government - ultimately by 
politicians [5]. Although voting (decision-making) is the most obvious and decisive 
display of power by citizens over politicians, in this case the perceived threat to them in 
advancing issues that are counter to a strong, specific, set of values or interest could have 
been preventing politicians from making policy change at the time this research was 
undertaken. Arguably politicians could be socialized to respect democratic accountability 
– i.e. to advance policy that is in line with public values. It could, therefore, be suggested 
that Lukes’ view of power through socialization, where “[A]… exercises power over [B] 
by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” is at play here as well.  
 
In contrast to the provincial approval process, the relationship between municipal 
governments and proponents provides an example of Emerson’s view of power. Here 
Emerson (1962, 34) saw power as a function of dependency between A and B; wherein 
both could hold power at the same time, and the exertion of power by one did not negate 
the power held by the other. Developers derive financial resources from development 
proceeding. When development applications are denied, the resources associated with 
that development are not realized. In this case, the municipality has control over the 
development approval process (and therefore, its associated resources). Similarly, as 
municipal governments rely on taxes derived from development, the developer also has 
power in the resources it could offer the municipality from approved development.  This 
power does not negate the power that the municipality holds by having decision-making 
power on development; both hold power at the same time. 
 
The Contribution of Theories of Power Relations to Practice 
 
As several cases above demonstrate, there is usually not just an A and a B; there are 
likely Cs, Ds, Es, and Fs, involved as well. The use of power dynamics to influence 
policy decisions will vary by policy issue, and the potential for clearly influencing power 
relations will depend on the topic and the groups involved. Further, in some cases, 
multiple manifestations of power relations identified by the four theories can occur 
simultaneously. For example, in the case of municipal development-related decision-
making, there was an emergence of both Dahl’s manifestation of power and that of 
Emerson.  
 
Thus, there may be a wide range and number of power relations in a given policy 
development or decision-making context, and a range of policy issues to be addressed, as 
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well as changing values and a changing context.  It is therefore not possible to tie specific 
strategies and tools for recognising and understanding power relations in this context to 
particular theories of power, and we do not attempt this although some connections are 
made below; rather, policy is ultimately a balancing act across interests, and it is those 
interests that generate power relations and no one theory can be completely ‘correct’ for a 
particular situation, or one prescription always pertinent.  
 
Instead, the theories presented here provide an important framework or lens for 
policymakers to use to help them to surmise, gauge, predict or just identify where and 
how power relations may have the potential to impact policy outcomes, and the various 
ways that actors may seek to influence policy processes, especially in policy 
implementation. Being aware of the potential power relations or dynamics that can 
emerge, particularly before they escalate to manifestation and clear attempts to unduly 
influence decision-making, is useful for keeping the policy processes effective and on 
track. This approach aims towards managing interests and ultimately achieving decisions 
that render positive floodplain management outcomes, through policy development or 
implementation, and meet the interests - to the extent possible or appropriate - of the 
multiple parties affected. The theories offer an understanding of how those influences 
may be exercised, including revealing underlying interests, and the likely sources of and 
manifestation of influence and associated behaviours. 
 
To simplify somewhat, these behaviours identified by the theories presented above 
include: 
 
 A is able to get B to do something that s/he would not do otherwise (Dahl, 1957); 
 B failing to raise an issue with A because B believes A would oppose the idea 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962); A exerting control over political processes and 
systems, and over values, beliefs and opinions of less powerful actors in the 
systems, thereby preventing decision-making on issues important to B (Bachrach 
& Baratz, 1962) 
 A exercising power by influencing and determining the desires of B (Lukes, 
1974) 
 Power is manifested by A or B according to who holds or controls the needed 
resources at a given time (Emerson, 1962) 
 
In practice, recognising and gauging early signs of the extent of escalating power 
relations and managing them is liable to be context specific, but could involve certain 
stages, strategies, and tools. Early signs are likely to be recognized as letters to 
policymakers from actors advocating certain policy directions; newspaper and other 
media stories orientated towards specific decision options; meetings with policymakers 
and/or other interested parties to present positions; formal questions to ministers and their 
equivalent; requests for meetings at higher levels or with politicians; coalitions 
developing of unlikely partners; walking away from broader policy processes (or 
suggestions in this direction); and warnings of undesirable indirect consequences, some 
of which antagonists could engineer. Such actions all need to be gauged and may reflect 
several of the four types of behaviours listed above. 
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Strategies for Managing Power Relations in Policy Development and 
Implementation 
 
Without a strategy for managing power relations, matters may escalate to executive or 
political levels of government in order to unduly influence or distort policy outcomes of 
where draft policies or processes are disputed – for whatever reason. Such matters may 
relate to aspects of the draft policy itself, the entire policy/approach or issue pursued, or 
the relationship of the decision(s) to broader picture issues. 
 
The four strategies presented here are in no sense new, and are inherently interrelated, but 
represent good practices in environmental policymaking used by government employed 
staff in Alberta.  We see them being deployed within a staged process of, first, the 
recognition and identification of power dynamics, secondly an analysis of those 
dynamics, thirdly a process of synthesis and communication with final decision-makers, 
and finally the communication of the policy decision taken. Each stage may well see 
deployed any or all of the four strategies outlined below.  
 
We believe these strategies and a similarly staged approach are likely to be useful 
elsewhere, suitably amended based on the policymaking environment and the dynamics 
at play there.  Here we seek only to provide policymakers (policy writers and final 
decision-makers) with approaches to managing power relations, prior to their emergence 
or after the manifestation of such relations, should the behaviours identified by the four 
theories show the potential to emerge. These strategies may not completely prevent 
power from influencing policy development and its implementation, but may be key to 
diffusing or minimizing power-imbalance related and distorting influences on policy 
decisions. Beyond that, high-level decision makers will always use their judgment as to 
how best to manage these pressures.  
Strategy 1: Promoting Well-informed Decision-making Processes 
 
Government policy advisors and policy teams that draft policy are employed to provide 
policy options and objective advice, in part through assisting final decision makers’ 
participation in informed discussions, including with potentially powerful actors. In this 
way they can perceive the type behaviours those actors might display - and understand 
them in relation to, say, Dahl’s (1957) or Emerson’s (1962) theories - and thereby to 
make informed decisions. 
 
Policymakers should make sure they have a clear picture of the appropriateness of the 
policy options for managing the floodplain management issue at hand: power 
relations/dynamics, and of the interests and potential behaviours of all parties involved 
(A; B; etc); the costs; benefits; risks; and ultimately the trade-offs to be made.  
 
Final decision-makers should be able to weigh this information, secure in the knowledge 
that the issue and power relations have been properly identified, the relative strength or 
importance to the stakeholders analysed comprehensively, and that they are able to make 
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a decision that is communicated publicly and demonstrated to be sensible in the policy 
context.   
Strategy 2: Ensuring Transparency through Public Consultation and Clear 
Communication of Process 
 
Transparency in FMP decisions, including final-stage modification of decisions, and the 
reasons why choices were made (which may be include influential interests considered 
important enough to change direction), is key to managing the influence of powerful 
actors on final decisions, because it requires clear justification of the influence of power 
dynamics on the decision.  The greater the transparency, judging from our experience 
here and in policy development elsewhere (Green and Penning-Rowsell, 2010), the 
greater is the likelihood also that the more complex behaviours as described by Lukes 
(1974) and Emerson (1962) can be detected. The position of B in Dahl-type behaviours 
also is much weakened in situations of information deficit. 
 
Engagement (or consultation), particularly multi-stakeholder consultation
7
 allowing for 
an exchange of diverse views and interests of those who are interested and/or affected by 
the decision to be made, in one room, has numerous benefits. In the context of this paper, 
it provides an opportunity for influencers to influence in a transparent forum rather than 
behind closed doors. All actors (A; B; C; etc) have the same access to policymakers (cf. 
Thaler and Keitel, 2016).   
 
Additionally, multi-stakeholder engagement allows for further understanding of the 
interests and positions or behaviours at play on the issue, and learning about the 
experience or interests of other stakeholders. Open dialogue allows the policy writer, 
where possible, to collect information on interests and on emerging dynamics, so as to be 
able to manage those interests during the writing of policy. This means carefully 
addressing the floodplain management issue in a way that reasonably manages some or 
all of the interests of all stakeholders providing input, in the context of the issue, at the 
time of writing, whilst also considering the broader picture. It further allows for an 
exploration of underlying assumptions that may not be accurate, which can often be the 
cause of an actor escalating an issue to higher levels. Instead, the potential for such 
escalation is managed by finding solutions (within the policy writer’s purview) that 
parties can accept, as policy is written.  
 
Further, rules of engagement requiring that all inputs on the policy decision must be 
made transparent to the broader group at all stages can also help manage bilateral 
discussions (A with C; C with E, etc). Active listening; understanding of interests; and, 
demonstrating where interests are being met in the development of draft policy (and if 
they are not, why they are not), are also key here. The same applies to being transparent 
with final decision factors and any changes that occur between different policy drafts 
(e.g. prior to advancing to the final decision-makers), the reasons for those decisions, and 
the final outcome. This has the potential to address the fears that interests have not been 
                                                        
7 Ensuring that such engagement is accessible, by providing appropriate methods for audience and funding, 
if necessary, to support participation is important to reaping the benefits of this strategy. 
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considered, which can lead to the manifestation of power relations as identified by the 
four behaviours discussed above, and to generate an outcome that meets some of the 
interests of the powerful party, preventing the emergence of clear power dynamics and 
breakdown.  
Strategy 3: Actively Managing the Policy Process and Communication 
 
Managing the policy process is an important strategy to be used by both the policy writer 
and the decision-maker, including ongoing communication between different levels of 
government even at the stages of the recognition of power relations and their analysis.  
 
For the policy writer, briefing final decision-makers throughout the development of 
policy to ensure that they are aware of potential issues that may trigger the emergence of 
power dynamics is important to ensuring they have information required for informed 
decision-making and engagement with potentially powerful actors, should engagement be 
requested by those actors. Equally, final decision-makers may have broad picture 
information and a different awareness (e.g. political) pertaining to these aspects and 
should relay that information to policy writers to ensure they are working within the most 
current context. As a result of this process management, policy writers are able to adapt 
accordingly to the information or advice provided by final decision-makers.  
 
There are dangers managed through this approach. We may find parties (A) attempting to 
influence decision makers (B) by influencing and determining the desires of B (Lukes, 
1974), for example through attempting to change the discourse. Having a history of clear 
briefing and open lines of communication to allow for additional updates can assist final 
decision-makers in understanding these attempts to influence. This can help to ensure that 
decision-makers continue to make decisions based on the objective advice and clear 
understanding of the trade-offs being managed across different interests in the face of 
conflicting information. 
Strategy 4: Acknowledging Constraints on Decisions 
Policy is developed under various constraints that are often outside of the control or 
influence of the extant policy process and interests. For example, the current political 
agenda, current public values, and available resourcing for implementation, can place 
bounds on the potential options. Having an awareness of such constraints will assist 
policymakers in providing a rationale to stakeholders for not (fully or partially) meeting 
their interests on a particular FMP issue.  
 
Existing policy and legislation also can encapsulate a series of related prior decisions and, 
therefore, impose potential constraints on new policy. The provincial Water Act process 
represented an example of government (i.e. A in Dahl’s sense), when deciding to allow or 
disallow development in the floodplain, being constrained by that legislation, which 
creates bounds on setting the conditions under which development could occur. 
Somewhat similarly, the presence of the North Saskatchewan River Valley Area 
Redevelopment Plan may have prevented the influence of a lobby group on subsequent 
policy due to the series of decisions already made within that plan.  
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It is also important to ensure decision-makers and participants are clear about the policy 
goals and the objective(s) sought, as well as the specific floodplain issue to be managed, 
through the policy development or implementation. These place bounds on what interests 
may be in scope and out of scope in the discussion. The Rocky View County case 
illustrates how the awareness of key decision-makers of clear goals can keep a policy 
development process on track and avoid undue disruptive influence by potentially 
powerful actors.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In Alberta, as in many instances elsewhere in the world, power manifests itself among a 
wide range of actors at several levels and scales in both policy change and policy 
implementation processes in the field of flood risk and floodplain management. 
 
A review of such manifestations of power in our case study reveals that all three 
dimensions of power presented by Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes are present at 
different times and in different relationships. In some cases, the power is only about 
decision-making; in other cases, such as in the case of the Alberta public and politicians, 
decision-making, keeping decisions off the agenda, and a possible socialization 
component that could lead politicians to want what they perceive the voting public to 
want, are all present. Emerson’s view of power is also clearly present, as seen in the 
municipality-developer relationship.  
 
However, the situations we researched are not that straightforward. Context changes over 
time in this case and in others, and complicates matters (cf. Penning-Rowsell and 
Johnson, 2015). Times have changed and as a result, those who “hold the power” have 
changed, trade-offs have changed, and the winners and losers of floodplain management 
policy implementation and change have, therefore, changed.  Changing context, including 
the occurrence of flooding, an increasing risk, changing policy, or changing societal 
values or memories, can shift power dynamics, causing the trade-offs to be re-considered 
(and ultimate policy decisions made) and changed.  
 
The Alberta case demonstrates that, as elsewhere, there are many conflicting uses of land, 
and many conflicting influences and interests in floodplain management.  In many 
jurisdictions there are many demands on increasingly scarce land, and trade-offs must be 
made. Decision-makers are faced with complicated decisions about floodplain 
management policy, and will be faced with pressure from those constituents who value 
private property and minimal government intervention, from a public affected by 
flooding that argues for more stringent policy, and from communities built in the 
floodplain a hundred years ago who wish to see their communities grow, despite the 
increasing risk and potential cost; sometimes these will be the same individuals, and their 
priorities will change over time.  
 
This case further demonstrates that power dynamics are important in floodplain 
management policy implementation and change, but other important factors can influence 
the advancement and implementation of policy. Increasing policy requirements from 
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other levels of governments, which can lead to policy change or influence certain 
decisions, is one factor that emerged in this case. Another key factor is the large cost of 
floodplain management measures, in the context of a changing economy and limited 
resources available to address all publicly funded needs.  
 
We can now therefore see that examining floodplain management policy implementation 
and change through the lens of theories of power remains insufficient for understanding 
the full complexity of the flood management policy issue. Using all four 
conceptualizations of power dynamics at once, let alone one, has been found not to fully 
explain a set of processes that is, itself, inherently dynamic.  
 
However, progress has been made: policy development can be a complex exercise, and 
power relations represent an additional layer of complexity that policymakers must at 
least be aware of in order to stay on track. Having an understanding of the power 
dynamics and the source and strength of the power for various parties does allow very 
important issues to be identified, many of which could require detailed analysis and 
attention to ensure the decisions/trade-offs to be made by decision-makers are clear and 
appropriate, and that those affected by the decisions are also aware of the trade-offs being 
made.  
 
The behaviours and manifestation of influences described by the four theories of power, 
and the strategies offered here of promoting informed decisions, transparency, clear 
communication, and constraint acknowledgement - whilst deliberately not directly linked 
to individual theories - could present policymakers with the means to understand and 
thereby to manage these power dynamics and their impact on final policy decisions. A 
better appreciation of these power dynamics in other countries and other situations is also 
one way of influencing decisions that could lead to better solutions rather than accept the 
status quo, not least in giving policymakers the information, insight and ability to 
minimize the number and extent of the inevitable losers from any floodplain management 
policy that they seek to promote.  
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Table 1.  Personal Communications/ interviewees 
 
Participant and number (cited in 
the text as [1], [2], etc) 
Date Citation 
in text 
Anonymous December, 2012 [1] 
Anonymous January, 2013 [2] 
Puhlmann, R. Reclamation 
Approvals Specialist, Central 
Region. Government of Alberta 
January 11, 2013 [3] 
Simieritsch, R. Senior Water 
Administration Technologist, 
Southern Region. Government of 
Alberta.  
November, 15, 2012 [4] 
Taggart, J. Head, Surface Water 
Policy, Water Policy Branch; 
Former Head in Flood 
Forecasting, Environmental 
Monitoring Branch. Government 
of Alberta 
Interview 1: December 4, 
2012 [5,1] 
 
Interview 2: December 
19, 2012 [5,2] 
[5,1] 
 
 
[5,2] 
Willms, C. Former Municipal 
Ecologist. Rocky View County, 
Alberta.  
December 19, 2012 [6] 
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Table 2. Actors in Floodplain Management Policy in Alberta and their sources of 
authority  
 
Actor Role  Authority source 
Politicians  Decision-makers on 
policy  
 
Government 
of Alberta 
 
 
 Managers and regulators 
of development in the 
floodway  
 Managers of Flood 
Hazard Identification 
Program 
 Responsible for disaster 
recovery programs 
Floodway: Authority granted under 
the Water Act, R.S.A 2000, c W-3. 
In Alberta, the “floodway” (or flood 
hazard area) is “the area within 
which the entire design flood 
[1:100] can be conveyed while 
meeting certain water elevation rise, 
water velocity and water depth 
criteria” (GOA, 2012c, 55). The 
“flood fringe” is “the land along the 
edges of the flood risk area that has 
relatively shallow water …with 
lower velocities…” (GOA, 2012c, 
55). For ease of discussion, these 
both are referred to here as the 
“floodplain”. 
Municipal 
Governments 
 Managers of 
development in the 
flood fringe;  
 Municipal land zoning 
(Municipal Government 
Act, 2000) 
Zoning: Authority granted under the 
Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 
2000, c. M-36 
Government 
of Canada 
 Flood Damage 
Reduction Program 
(1989-1999) 
 Ongoing indirect role 
Ongoing indirect role: Activities 
related to navigation, fisheries, 
interprovincial/international issues, 
and works that are beneficial to 
Canada or to two or more provinces 
(Environment Canada, 2012). 
Interest 
Groups  
 Seek to influence 
governments on issues 
of interest 
 
Proponents  Seek to undertake 
construction in the 
floodplain. 
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